Vitalik Buterin, the co-founder of Ethereum, has put forth three alternative methods designed to simplify the proof-of-stake design of the Ethereum blockchain.
In his recent blog post, Buterin outlined this initiative, aiming to address a potential systemic complexity within Ethereum’s consensus mechanism. The proposals primarily focus on diminishing the number of required signatures per slot in the blockchain.
Presently, Ethereum supports 895,000 validator objects for decentralization, processing approximately 28,000 signatures in a single day and 1,790,000 post-SSF. Buterin’s detailed proposal seeks to reduce the load to 8,192 signatures per slot post-SSF.
Ethereum Proof of Stake Simplification Proposal
Vitalik Buterin’s first proposal involves a shift towards decentralized staking pools, aiming to simplify the proof-of-stake process by reducing the number of individual validators. This entails increasing the minimum ether required for staking, compelling smaller validators to collaborate in pools. Buterin suggested, “We could raise the min deposit size to 4,096 ETH and make a total cap of 4,096 validators.”
The second proposal introduces a dual-layer of stakers to enhance network security and efficiency. Buterin outlined this as creating a “heavy” layer with a 4,096 ETH requirement participating in finalization, and a “light” layer with no minimum.
Buterin’s third proposal involves a rotating set of validators, intending to distribute the validation process more evenly across the network. He proposes, “For each slot, we choose 4,096 currently active validators, and we carefully adjust that set during each slot in such a way that we still have safety.”
“Why Not Just Do Committees”
Vitalik Buterin emphasized the drawbacks of the committee-based security model employed by some blockchains. In this model, a group of validators is randomly selected for each slot, lacking accountability in the event of a 51% attack. In such attacks, the economic cost to the attackers is minimal as most involved validators go unnoticed, having not been chosen for the committee.
In contrast, Ethereum’s existing system imposes significant penalties for similar attacks, slashing a substantial portion of the attackers’ deposits. While effective, Ethereum’s high-penalty approach may be deemed excessively punitive. Therefore, a balanced solution is sought that maintains a high total amount of slashable Ethereum while making some concessions on validator accountability.
